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Introduction
For the most part, derivations of optimal rules for the conduct of monetary policy have taken place in a linear-quadratic (L-Q) framework, stemming from the combination of a quadratic objective function for the policymaker and a linear dynamic system describing the economy; cf., inter alia, Taylor (1993 Taylor ( , 1999 , Svensson (1997) and Clarida et al.(1998 Clarida et al.( , 2000 . When the policy instrument is a short-term interest rate, this combination leads to a linear reaction function (Taylor rule) whereby central banks adjust nominal interest rates proportionally to in°ation and output deviations from their targets.
There are, however, at least three good motives to challenge the L-Q paradigm underlying linear Taylor rules. First, it has been recognised for some time that the short-run in°ation-output trade-o® may be nonlinear.
For instance, convexity may arise under the traditional Keynesian assumption that nominal wages are°exible upwards but rigid downwards, giving rise to a quasi-convex AS schedule; c.f. Baily (1978) . More recently, Akerlof et al.(1996) have further elaborated on this argument claiming that even a downward-sloping Phillips curve (in the in°ation-unemployment space) might hold in the long-run at very low rates of in°ation due to the existence of money illusion on the part of the workers when there is price stability. Conversely, Stiglitz (1977) argues in favour of a concave relationship when the output gap is negative on the grounds that¯rms operating under monopolistic competition may exhibit increasingly greater willingness to reduce prices under weak demand to avoid being undercut by rival¯rms. Orphanides and Wieland (2000) is, to our knowledge, the¯rst paper to consider this type of nonlinearity in the derivation of optimal reaction functions. In particular, they allow for a zone-linear Phillips curve where in°ation is essentially stable for a range of output gaps and changes outside this range, providing in this way a good theoretical rationale for in°ation-zone as opposed [1] to in°ation point-targeting behaviour by central banks. From an empirical viewpoint, Laxton et al. (1995 Laxton et al. ( , 1999 , Alvarez-Lois (2000) , Gerlach (2000) and others have presented evidence in favour of a convex shape for several European countries and the US whereby the in°ationary tendencies of capacity constraints on prices imply a considerably steeper Phillips curve when the output gap is positive than when it is negative. In every case, the derived implication is an asymmetric response of in°ation with respect to the output gap.
Secondly, there is a growing body of research that departs from the standard assumption of a quadratic loss function by acknowledging the possibility that central banks may have asymmetric preferences with respect to in°a-tion and/or output gaps. For example, given that some central bankers are supposed to be accountable to elected political o±cials, Cukierman (1999) points out that they may have greater aversion to recessions than to expansions. Under these asymmetric preferences, an in°ation bias ¶ a la BarroGordon emerges even when the policymaker targets the natural output level rather than a larger level. By contrast, Mishkin and Posen (1997) argue that a de°ation bias might be a more likely outcome, since independent central banks often tend to deny the possibility that an expansionary monetary policy stance can reduce cyclical unemployment, and report some favourable evidence to this viewpoint for the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England. Clarida and Gertler (1997) , in turn, have tested formally for the null hypothesis of symmetry and found evidence against it for the Bundesbank. More recently, Orphanides and Wieland (2000) , Ruge-Murcia (2002) , , Surico (2002) and Cukierman and Muscatelli (2002) have analysed the implications for the derivation of interest-rate reaction functions of assuming asymmetric preferences with respect to in°ation and /or output by the policymaker. In particular, ¯nd that, in the absence of certainty equivalence, when the central banker associates a larger loss to positive than to negative in°ation deviations, uncertainty induces a prudent [2] behaviour by the monetary authorities which is re°ected by the inclusion of the conditional variance of in°ation as an additional argument in the Taylor rule. Allowing as well for asymmetric preferences as regards the output gap, Cukierman and Muscatelli (2002) provide evidence showing that central banks in some G7 economies develop a precautionary demand for expansions and for low in°ation once credibility-building and disin°ation have been achieved.
Lastly, there is a third source of nonlinearity which stems from uncertainty regarding the NAIRU or the trend growth rate of productivity. As Meyer et al. (2001) have shown, in periods of heightened uncertainty about the NAIRU (like the second half of the 1990s in the US following the IT-induced productivity acceleration), an optimal updating rule of the NAIRU leads to a nonlinear interest-rate policy according to which policymakers are more cautious about adjusting interest rates in response to small output gaps than in a standard linear Taylor rule but more aggressive when they reach a certain threshold.
In view of these arguments, our goal of this paper is to extend the available evidence on the presence of asymmetric features in monetary policy rules. Speci¯cally, our focus is restricted to the¯rst source of nonlinearity. To this end, we re-examine the analytical implications of assuming a nonlinear short-term in°ation-output trade-o® in the derivation of such rules and provide some empirical evidence consistent with this nonlinearity. By assuming a quadratic functional form for the e®ects of the output gap in an accelerationist Phillips curve we obtain a modi¯ed Taylor rule which only di®ers from the conventional linear speci¯cation in that it includes an interaction between expected in°ation and the output gap as an additional term in the Euler equation. This simple device allows us to capture the asymmetric response of the interest rate to in°ation and output gaps which turns out [3] to be optimal in this framework.
1 Our results echo those recently derived by Schaling (1999) in a more restricted setup than ours. Deriving this modi¯ed policy rule for the speci¯c model considered here, together a cross-country empirical analysis supporting the usefulness of the proposed approach, is the contribution of the paper to the literature.
Our empirical approach relies upon testing for the statistical signi¯cance of the interaction term in the estimation of two types of models. First, we consider an Euler equation speci¯cation, in line with the in°uential approach by Clarida et al.(1998) to capture the performance of a policy rule in describing the evolution of a continuosly adjusted short-term interest rate, like (say) an overnight interest rate. Second, we consider an ordered probit model which, as pointed out by , is a useful modelling strategy to analyse the determinants of decisions concerning adjustments in interest rates which only take place irregularly and in discrete increments, as is the case of discount rates. The proposed methodologies are applied to estimate the interest rate-setting behaviour of three European central banks (Banque de France, Bundesbank and Banco de España), the US Federal Reserve and the (surrogate) European Central Bank (ECB) over di®erent sample periods.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the basic theory behind the derivation of the optimal interest-rate reaction function under a nonlinear Phillips curve in a simple model along the lines of Svensson (1997) . With this illustrative model in mind, we derive the main features of the nonlinear policy rule which serves as a benchmark for the empirical section. Section 3 presents the empirical results obtained from applying the two econometric methodologies described above to¯ve central banks. Finally, 1 Kim et al. (2002) have recently investigated the nature of nonlinearities in monetary policy rules using Hamilton ¶s (2001)°exible nonlinear methodology and conclude that our proposed interaction term is the one that does best in characterising nonlinear policy rules in the US Fed up to 1979.
[4] Section 4 concludes.
2 Policy rules with a nonlinear Phillips curve
Basic principles
To make the basic point of the paper without introducing unnecessary complications, we modify a minimalist backward-looking model of the economy proposed by Svensson (1997) by allowing for a nonlinear Phillips curve.
In this setup, in°ation is determined by an accelerationist Phillips curve, output follows a simple autoregressive process and the monetary policy instrument is a short-term nominal interest rate. Since the model is not based on explicit microfoundations, as in Clarida et al (1998 Clarida et al ( , 2000 or Woodford (1999) , issues related to credibility and reputation are left aside, in exchange for expositional simplicity.
In every period, the policymaker sets the nominal interest rate, i, with the aim of maintaining in°ation deviations from a target, e ¼=¼-¼ ¤ , and the output gap,ỹ , close to zero. Assuming a quadratic per-period loss function in in°ation and output performance, L(e ¼ t ;ỹ t ) = [e ¼ t 2 +¸ỹ t 2 ], and a¯xed discount rate, ±, the policymaker ¶s objective in period t is to minimise the expected present discounted value of the per-period losses:
subject to the following two equations describing the evolution of the economy:
with
andỹ t+1 =¯ỹ t +´x t ¡ »r t + u y;t+1;
where E t is the conditional expectations operator, ± and¯2 [0; 1), and u ¼;t+1 and u y;t+1 are zero-mean normally distributed shocks.
Equation (2) represents an accelerationist Phillips curve (or AS schedule)
where the output gap enters in a nonlinear way, as de¯ned in equation (3). Linearity in (3) is recovered when Á = 0 and the function is convex (concave) if Á>0 (<0). 2 We assume the function to be increasing ( 1 + 2Áỹ>0) since this is likely to be the case for realistic values of Á andỹ t : Equation (4), in turn, is an IS schedule where the output gap exhibits sluggish adjustment, and depends on the real interest rate (r t = i t ¡ E t ¼ t+1 ), and on a predetermined/exogenous variable, x t ; possibly capturing other determinants of interest-rate setting in open economies (see, e.g. Ball, 1998) . The real interest rate a®ects output with one-period lag and, therefore, a®ects in°ation with a two-period lag. This timing convention is in line with the extensive literature on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy which establishes that an innovation in monetary policy leads to a change in output in the short run with in°ation only changing slowly later on (see e.g., Christiano et al, 1999) .
Totally di®erentiating (1) with respect to i t , subject to (2) ¡ (4) , yields the following Euler equation:
Using (4) to replace E tỹt+2 in terms of E tỹt+1 ; E t x t+1 and E t r t+1 , and solving for i in period t implies the following Taylor rule:
where the c i ¶s coe±cients are functions from the set of structural parameters (±, ®;¸; ¹; Á; ³and¯) so that c 1 =1 + ®=¸»¯; c 2 =(1 + ±¯2)=±»¯; c 3 =á
The modi¯ed Taylor rule in (6) resembles a linear one except for the last term, namely, the interaction of expected in°ation and the output gap. The intuition for the presence of this interaction term in the Euler equation is simple. If, for example, in°ation is expected to be above its target at period t + 1, the real interest rate will be below its equilibrium value at period t which, in turn, causes a higher output gap at t + 1 and higher in°ationary pressure at t + 2. In the linear case, the policymaker increases the interest rate by c 1 E t¡1 e ¼ t+1 . However, if the Phillips curve is convex (Á>0), then the future in°ationary pressure caused by the higher output gap will turn out to be larger than in the linear case. The policymaker, anticipating this higher pressure captured by the interaction term, will react more forcefully, since in this case c 4 >0. Conversely, if the Phillips curve is concave (Á<0), future in°ationary pressure will be lower than in the linear case and the increase in the interest rate will be smaller (c 4 <0). A similar intuition can be used to interpret an asymmetric response with respect to the output gap. If output is above trend at t, then the output gap at t+ 1 will be positive as well, given the serial correlation in (4), leading to a higher in°ationary pressure at t+2 than in the linear case because of the convex Phillips curve.
Although the previous argument has been derived in an Euler-equation context, it is interesting to know if a closed-form solution can be obtained.
[7]
Unfortunately, since our model deviates from the L-Q framework (quadratic objective but nonlinear economic structure), the value function in the Bellman equation associated to (1) is not quadratic. Thus, the well-known arguments used by Svensson (1997, Appendix B) in order to derive an analytical solution of the optimal interest-rate reaction function in this backwardlooking model cannot be applied. Instead, one should rely upon numerical dynamic programming algorithms, as the ones used by Orphanides and Wieland (2002) , to obtain approximate solutions. However, as Schaling (1999) has shown, if the policymaker is a pure point-in°ation targetter (¸=0) and, for algebraic purposes, a slightly modi¯ed function g(ỹ t )=ỹ t =(1 ¡ Áỹ t ) is used instead of the quadratic f(ỹ t ) adopted in (2), then a simple closed-form solution exists.
3 In e®ect, due to the recursive dynamic structure of (2) and (4), the interest rate in period t should be set to achieve E t (e ¼ t+2 )=0: Assuming a deterministic problem ( i.e., that the variances of of the shocks in (2) and (4), u ¼ and u y ;are zero) yields the following closed-form solution for the nominal interest rate:
where i t is a nonlinear function of the in°ation and output gaps which, when Á tends to zero, collapses to the conventional linear Taylor rule in this type of backward-looking model (see Svensson, 1997) . The intuition for the presence of the nonlinear term in (7) is the same as the one provided for the interaction term in the Euler equation. For example, considering, for illustrative purposes, that ®=0:5, »=1;and Á=0:3, the appropriate interest rate changes stemming from §0:5 % in°ation gaps are §1:5 % in the linear case whereas they are 1:93% and ¡1:27%, respectively, in the nonlinear case. Hence, when the Phillips curve is convex, the policymaker reacts more forcefully (in absolute value) to positive in°ation gaps than to negative gaps, and the opposite will happen under concavity (Á<0).
4
Finally, a brief comment is o®ered about the implications of having a nonlinear Phillips curve on the in°ation bias which typically occurs in the well-known Barro-Gordon ¶s analysis of discretionary monetary policy. Let us consider, for simplicity, a static optimization problem where the loss func-
; with k>1 capturing the existence of labour-market rigidities or distorting taxes. 5 Assume that the structure of the economy is given by the Phillips curve ¼ = ¼ e + g(e y) and e y = p + u y ,
where ¼ e represents the agents' rational expectation of ¼; e y is considered to be the control variable which depends linearly on a deterministic policy instrument, p, and u y is an innovation: Then, taking expectations (E) in thē rst-order condition of the optimal discretionary policy yields:
Note that with Á = 0; the standard in°ation bias,¸(k ¡ 1)
, we know from Jensen ¶s inequality that Eh(z)<h(Ez) if h(z) is concave. It can be easily checked that sign h"(z) = ¡sign(Á): Thus, convexity of the Phillips curve, Á>0; implies concavity of h(z). Moreover, since in equilibrium (when z=0) h(Ez) = 0, we get Eh(z)<0: Thereby, even when k = 1; convexity of the Phillips curve implies, on average, a positive in°ation bias as long as there is output stabilisation (¸>0). Likewise, it is easy to check that, since Eg(e y)=0 when z=0, then convexity leads to Ee y<0, namely, the expected level of output is lower than the natural level. The intuition for this de°ation bias in expected output 4 Allowing for uncertainty in the form of shocks to the the output gap (u y; t+1 ) in (4), a closed-form solution no longer exists but it can be proved that the interest-rate response to in°ation gaps will be larger than in the model without uncertainty (see Schaling, 1999) .
5 Without loss of generality, we set ¼ ¤ = 0
[9]
stems from the asymmetric interest rate-setting behaviour under a convex Phillips curve whereby policymakers, in achieving a given in°ation target, have a greater incentive to avoid periods of excess demand, as these require longer and/or more severe recessions to undo the in°ation generated when output is above target. 
Econometric speci¯cations
To assess the empirical support of the departure of the L-Q framework considered here, we rely upon two alternative econometric strategies which are described in turn.
Euler equation approach
First, we test for the statistical signi¯cance of the interaction term directly in the Euler equation derived in (6). For that, we replace the expectations by realised values in (6), yielding the following policy rule in t:
where, for estimation purposes, we have introduced two slight modi¯cations in equation (8). First, in accord with most of the empirical literature, we take k=12, instead of k=1, to be the horizon used by central banks in forecasting in°ation when data has monthly frequency as it is in our case. And, secondly, as is also conventional, we allow for a lagged dependent variable to capture interest-rate smoothing for which there are several motivations in the literature. While it is not possible to recover all structural parameters from the estimated coe±cients in (8), what really matters from the viewpoint of this paper is that c 4 is the only coe±cient which embodies information about 6 Nobay and Peel (2000) obtain similar results, except that the sign of the in°ation bias is ambiguous, using a Linex functional form,`(e y)=°¡ 1 (e ®°e y -1):
[10]
the nonlinear Phillips curve, so that the restriction Á = 0 implies c 4 = 0: Indeed, it is straightforward to check that the ratio c 4 =2(c 1 ¡ 1) yields a direct estimate of Á: Hence testing H 0 : Á = 0 is equivalent to testing H 0 : c 4 =0
as long as c 1 is di®erent from unity. Since (8) is linear in the coe±cients, the key advantage of directly testing H 0 : c 4 =0 is that it does not require estimating a nonlinear model in the parameters. As for the error term in (8) it is de¯ned as:
where the term in brackets is a linear combination of forecast errors and therefore orthogonal to any variable in the information set available at t ¡ 1.
As is conventional in models involving rational expectations, the estimation method relies upon the choice of a set of instruments, Z t ; from the set of variables within the central bank ¶s information set, such as lagged variables that help forecast in°ation and output or any other contemporaneous variables that are uncorrelated with the policy rule shock, À t . Then, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) can be used to estimate the parameter vector in (8) by exploiting the set of orthogonality conditions E(À t =Z t ) = 0: Since the composite disturbance has an MA(k) representation, due to the overlapping nature of the forecast errors, the Hansen-Hodrick weighting var-cov matrix, which puts a weight of 1 on the¯rst k covariances and 0 on all others, is used to implement GMM. Finally, Hansen ¶s J test is used to test the overidenti¯cation restrictions.
Ordered probit approach
Secondly, to check how relevant is the role the interaction term in other types of interest-rate reaction functions, we estimate an ordered probit model which is the appropriate econometric framework to analyse the determinants of decisions about the discrete and infrequent adjustments that characterise the behaviour of discount rates (see Dolado and Maria-Dolores, 2002) . Under this approach, the underlying assumption is that the policymaker takes a decision every period about adjusting a discount rate in terms of the following changes: large or small reductions, no change, and large and small increases. Speci¯cally, we will assume that these changes are discrete and use a breakdown of adjustments into the following¯ve categories, captured by a set of dummy variables, which are ordered in steps of 25 basis points each:
(large decrease) c t = 1 () ¢i t < ¡0:25 The observed dummy variable, c t ; depends on a latent index, c ¤ t ; according to the following rule:
where c ¤ t is taken to be a latent continuous random variable triggering adjustments and the ® 0 s are the thresholds that the latent variable must cross to change the value of c t : The underlying index is assumed to depend linearly on a set of covariates, x t ; such that
The¯rst three regressors in (9) mimic those considered in the derivation of the Euler equation while the nature of the remaining regressors, s t , will be discussed in section 3. Although this speci¯cation has not been derived from a theoretical model on the adjustment decisions, it is bound to capture the same sort of considerations as in (6), this time in the discrete change framework which characterises the evolution of discount rates. Hence, we loosely interpret a test of H 0 :¯3=0 as indirect evidence for H 0 :Á = 0: Assuming that " t follows a n.i.d. (0, ¾ 2 " ), estimates of the parameter vector (®; ) are then obtained by maximising the following likelihood function (see Maddala, 1983) :
where ©(:) is the cumulative gaussian distribution function.
3 Estimation results
Data
To estimate equation (8) The idea is to study how a \surrogate" ECB would have behaved had it exerted monetary control over the Euro area during a period comprising the pre-EMU period (before 1999(Q1)) and afterwards.
7
The short-term intervention interest rates in (8) As regards the in°ation target, ¼ ¤ , we consider a departure from the usual assumption that it is constant, as in Clarida et al.(1998) , since in some countries in°ation has slowly converged from above to its target value implying that a constant target seems to be less plausible than a gradually moving one. Instead we adopt a time-varying in°ation target, ¼ ¤ t , according to the following considerations: (i) for Germany, we take the in°ation target to be the one established by the Bundesbank in its annual reports; (ii) for France, the German target in°ation rate, given the close links between both economies within EMU 9 ; (iii) for Spain, the o±cial in°ation rate in the 7 As a referee has pointed out, this exercise implicitly assumes that the ECB has the same preferences as national central banks before EMU. Note, however, that Alesina et al. (2001) dispute this assumption.
8 The residuals from adjusting a cubic trend to logged output led to similar results. 9 The in°ation target in this case is constant since the German target rate did not change from 2% during the sample period considered for France.
[14]
budget laws up to 1995 and the target in°ation rate reported by the Bank of Spain since 1996; (iv) for US, the target in°ation rates rates in the reports of the Council of Economic Advisors; and¯nally (v), for the Euro-zone, the German target in°ation rate again since German monetary policy served as an anchor to most of the other Euro area countries over the sample.
10 Annual in°ation target rates have been interpolated to a monthly frequency for the individual countries, and to a quarterly frequency for the Euro area. 11 For the sake of completeness, however, results obtained with a constant in°ation target are also reported below. As for the x t variable, the German interest rate has been used for France and Spain, the US interest rate for Germany and the Euro area, and the growth rates of borrowed and total reserves for the US. The list of instruments is: a constant term, two lags of the interest rate, six lags of the in°ation gap, six lags of the output gap, four lags of the interaction of in°ation and output lags, two lags of (logged) raw materials price index. Further, in the case of the three European countries, two lags of the German interest rate (for France and Spain) and of the US interest rate (for Germany), and two lags of the (logged) e®ective real exchange rate have been included.
To estimate equation (9), we have used the repo rate for France, the marginal target rate in the interbank reserves market for Spain, the discount rate for Germany, and the target Funds rate for the US. Although these series have higher frequency, the changes have been aggregated to a¯xed interval of a month, since these is the frequency at which information on in°ation, output and some on the other determinants of interest-rate setting arrives.
The sample periods are the same as above. Given that among the s t variables we allow for duration e®ects, i.e., the time elapsed since the last change, the 10 In a previous version of this paper (see Dolado et al., 2000) we estimated directly the response of interest rates to positive and negative, and large and small, in°ation and output gaps. To have observations of di®erent sign in in°ation gaps, the use of time-varying in°ation targets was needed.
11 The data on the time-varying in°ation target rates are available upon request.
[15]
\surrogate" ECB has not been included in this econometric exercise, since a weighted aggregation of the durations of discount rates in each individual central bank would be meaningless.
Preliminary analysis: A nonlinear Phillips curve?
To get some preliminary evidence on the key channel for a nonlinear policy rule highlighted in this paper, Table 1 reports the results from estimating the nonlinear speci¯cation chosen for the Phillips curve in (2). For that, the change in in°ation at t, ¢ ¼ t , has been regressed on f (y t¡1 ) to estimate the parameters ® and Á: A positive and statistically signi¯cant value of Á implies a convex Phillips curve. 12 The basic¯nding is that there is evidence favourable to a convex Phillips curve in all cases except in the US.
For illustrative purposes, Figure 1 depicts scatter plots of lagged output gap (horizontal axis) against change in in°ation (vertical axis), together with thē tted quadratic function, for the US and the Euro area. As can be observed, the¯tted curve is clearly convex in the Euro-zone whereas it can not be distinguished from a linear one in the US. 13 One possible explanation for these contrasting results could be that European labour markets are known to su®er from higher real wage rigidity than the US labour market, giving rise to a steeper short-run in°ation-output trade-o® when output is above the natural level than when it is below it. For example, Nickell (1997) reports conclusive evidence about higher downwards than upwards wage rigidity in
Europe, whereas such is not the case in the more°exible US labour market.
Thus, this preliminary evidence seemingly supports the existence of a convex 12 White ¶s robust standard errors have been used to compute the t-ratios of b ® and b Á since, as pointed out by , there is strong evidence of a GARCH process in the residuals of such equations.
13 Alvarez-Lois (2000)¯nds a nonlinear relation between the change in in°ation and a capacity utilization for the US. However, he uses quartely data, whose lower frequency facilitates¯nding a nonlinear relationship, and his sample period is much longer, from 1960 (Q1) to 2000 (Q1).
[16]
Phillips curve, at least in the three European countries and in the Euro area. Table 2 displays the results obtained from estimating equation (8) by the GMM method described above. For each country, three speci¯cations are presented in panels A, B and C .
Nonlinear Taylor rules
14 Results in panel A correspond to the speci¯cation excluding the x t variables and allowing for time-varying in°ation target, whereas those in panel B include x t . For the US and the Euro area, the coe±cients on x t for the di®erent proxies that we tried were never statistically signi¯cant and therefore are not reported. Finally, panel C displays the results obtained with a constant in°ation rate and allowing for x t : As for the coe±cients on the lagged dependent variables, denoted in the Table by ½ i (i = 1; 2); we found that only one lag was signi¯cant in the case of the three European countries whereas two lags were needed for the US and the Euro area. The existence of an AR (2) speci¯cation for the US agrees with the¯ndings of Clarida et al. (1998 Clarida et al. ( , 2000 .
In general, it is worth noticing that the p-values of the J-test (denoted as p-J in Table 2 ) do not reject the over-identifying restrictions. Further, the p-values of the F-test about the joint signi¯cance of the coe±cients obtained in the regression of e ¼ t+k ; e y t and (e ¼ t+k e y t ) on the set of instruments is also reported since a poor¯t in the¯rst stage of the GMM procedure may raise concern about lack of identi¯cation (see Arellano et al., 1999) .
The basic result to highlight is that the estimated coe±cient c 4 on the interaction term is always highly signi¯cant for the three European countries and the Euro area. By contrast, it is not signi¯cant for the US, in accord with the evidence in the previous sub-section and with the¯ndings of for the US using a longer sample period. Since the use of c 4 14 For France panel C is excluded since the German in°ation target is constant for the chosen sample period.
[17] to test indirectly for the signi¯cance of Á relies on c 1 being above unity it is worth discussing the results in this respect.
15 In all cases, except in France (panel B) and Spain , the point estimates of c 1 are above unity, in line with an in°ation-stabilising policy rule as explained by Clarida et al. (1998 Clarida et al. ( , 2000 . Nonetheless, as those authors have pointed out, when the relevant x t variable is a foreign interest rate, as in the three European countries, the correct interpretation is that the policy rule is a weighted average of the German interest rate for France and Spain, and the US interest rate for Table 1 . Indeed, using the delta method to compute 95% con¯dence intervals of Á; we cannot reject that the di®erences between both 15 Recall that c 1 = 1 + ®=¸»¯in (6), with all the parameters being positive.
[18]
sets of coe±cients are statistically insigni¯cant. Further, the only country for which the t-ratio of b Á is not signi¯cant is the US.
Finally, in order to ascertain the forecasting advantages of using the non- [19]
Ordered probit model
As discussed above, the speci¯c latent index of adjustments in (9) contains expected in°ation (with k=12), the output gap and the interaction between both variables plus an additional set of controls, s t . Among those variables, we have considered both the change in the discount rate in the previous month, ¢i t¡1 , and the number of months elapsed since the last intervention, D t ; to capture persistence in interventions. Likewise, with the same motivation as the x t variables in (6), changes in the F F /DM real exchange rate (¢rer t ) for France, and lagged changes of a foreign interest rate ( ¢i ¤ t¡1 ) have also been included. 16 Since the regressors in the probit model are assumed to be uncorrelated with the error term, the procedure of replacing expectations of future variables by their realized value becomes invalid in this case. Thus, rather than using the previous approach, our strategy is based on constructing in°ation forecasts from OLS regressions where the regressors are the instrumental variables used in the GMM approach. Table 3 shows the results of the above exercise. Most relevant from our viewpoint is the¯nding that the coe±cient on the interaction term,¯3; is estimated to be positive and signi¯cant for the three European countries and insigni¯cant for the US, in broad agreement with the result obtained earlier. Thus, the results seem to be fairly robust to the use of this alternative methodology. Of independent interest are the¯ndings that there are \du-ration" e®ects, in the sense that the probability of an adjustment depends positively on the time elapsed since the last intervention, and that the probabilitiy increases when the real exchange rate depreciates or when foreign discount rates rise.
In this paper we search for asymmetries in the policy responses of¯ve central banks to in°ation and output gaps. We have argued that such responses can arise when the Phillips curve underlying the derivation of the optimal policy rule is nonlinear. To test for the existence of such asymmetric features we use two empirical approaches. The¯rst one is based on the estimation of an Euler equation which allows for the interaction between expected in°ation and the output gap while the second relies on the estimation of an ordered probit model to capture the discrete nature of changes in discount rates, allowing again for the interaction term.
We¯nd signi¯cant evidence of nonlinearity in the policy rules of four European central banks after the 1980s, in the sense that the have tended to intervene with more virulence when in°ation and output move above their target than what a linear Taylor rule would predict. However, that is not the case for the Fed, where a linear Phillips curve cannot be rejected. These contrasting results between European countries and the US can be interpreted by the fact that the convexity of the Phillips curve relies upon the existence of labour market rigidities and that those are much more severe in the former than in the latter.
In sum, the results in this paper seem to con¯rm the hypothesis that there are nonlinearities in the operating procedures of central banks when setting a short-term interest rate to control monetary policy. Taking them into consideration may turn out to be helpful for¯nancial market analysts when they forecast the evolution of interest rates on the basis of the already very popular usage of Taylor rules.
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